A deranged publisher decided to produce a volume of some of my papers and asked me to write some comments. Since these amount to a summary of my views about international trade theory over the latest forty years or so, I'm giving the comments a separate alternative existence as a discussion paper.
Factor-Endowments Theory
The factor-endowments theory (aka the Heckscher-Ohlin theory) is a central component of trade theory. Indeed, until fairly recently it was also commonly referred to as the "modern" theory of international trade. But it reflects a very pronounced research philosophy.
This philosophy is to take for granted that trade is due to comparative advantage -as opposed to economies of scale or imperfect competition. And that comparative advantage is determined by differences in relative factor endowments -as opposed to differences in technology, tastes, or government policies. And its basic results are derived in the 2x2x2
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model. The pay-off to this courageous but limiting stance is a set of very strong predictions about, in addition to the pattern of comparative advantage itself (the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem), the relation between trade and the domestic distribution of income (Stolper-Samuelson), the relation between economic growth and trade (Rybczynski), and the respective roles of international markets in goods and in factors (Factor-Price Equalization). This is an approach just made for a confrontation with reality. That was not long in happening:
the Leontief Paradox. The resulting empirical literature, after more than half a century, has yet to reach a generally accepted conclusion.
My concern, though, was not with the empirical literature itself. Though that certainly has influenced me greatly. Rather, I was anxious to address the issue of theoretical robustness.
Accepting a focus on comparative-advantage trade (that is, ignoring trade due to economies of scale or to imperfect competition), I wondered whether the four basic results reflected the nature of factor-endowments based trade or simply the extreme simplicity of the HOS model.
That the answer was the latter seemed to be the conclusion that trade theory had reached by the 1970s, at least by implication. Many papers had striven to show that the four basic results did not hold literally outside the 2x2x2 HOS model, or that they could be made to hold only with additional restrictions that in effect required that a more general framework had to behave like the 2x2 HOS model. By contrast, Ron Jones has eloquently argued the practical usefulness of a low-dimensional approach.
In my paper, "Some of the Theorems of International Trade with Many Goods and Factors," included in this volume, I tried to reformulate the four basic results for a higher-dimensional context than HOS and to ask whether they held more generally. My conclusion was that, yes, the The HOS model assumes a production function for each good that produces only that good, i.e., it excludes joint production. This is relied upon by the proofs of the Stolper-Samuelson and Rybczynski theorems. In [3] and [4] Murray Kemp, Winston Chang and I asked how dependent upon this assumption the basic messages of the four results really are. Our conclusion, surprising to us, was that this dependence is actually limited. This is dramatically true when, as in [4], the rest of the panoply of the HOS structure is maintained. (Of course, you should remember that the basic purpose of this research program was to determine what would still be true without much of that panoply).
A prominent part of the trade-theory literature in the 1970s concerned time-phased production.
This amounted to replacing the abstract notion of "capital" with an explicit modeling of goods being produced today but used tomorrow. This aspect of trade theory was an offshoot of the "Cambridge controversies" of the day. If you do not know what those were, good for you. This literature argued strongly that traditional trade theory in general, and HOS in particular, delivered conclusions that were deeply suspect and misleading, because of it's neglect of the time-phased nature of production.
I was intrigued by this. Were these people actually on to something, or were they just using a different language for obfuscation? Answering this required a common language. So, in [5] and
[6], I adopted the time-phased models, defined "capital" as the value of the goods produced today but used tomorrow, and restated the conclusions of the time-phased literature in these terms. This made it clear that that literature was simply restating well-understood results in its own language.
(There were some distinct results, but they were minor and peripheral). That is, the time-phased literature really was just using a different language for obfuscation. This literature fortunately disappeared into obscurity in the 1980s. I deny any culpability.
The HOS model excludes international markets in the factors of production, although the factor-price equalization theorem addressed the consequences of that limitation. In 
Economies of Scale
As mentioned in the General Introduction, much work in the 1970s and 1980s was motivated by a dawning realization that a dominant share of world trade involved the exchange of relatively similar, manufactured goods (intra-industry trade) between relatively similar (industrial) countries.
This realization was significantly due to the work of Grubel and Lloyd. (Though there had been important earlier contributions, notably Balassa's empirical work and the unjustly ignored contribution by Gray). Herb Grubel was sometimes dismissed as a lightweight, but the fact is that, during the 1960s and 1970s, he was consistently ahead of the curve on the important issues.
And I confess to a soft spot for him: Herb was the first established economist to say that he thought I had done something useful and interesting.
Comparative-advantage trade, of course, is trade to exploit international differences. So there was a wide belief that this actual trade could not be comparative-advantage trade. It was this wide belief that stimulated a huge amount of work into economies of scale and imperfect competition as alternative reasons for trade. To put it succinctly, the comparative-advantage assertion that: "trade is due to international differences" simply does not imply "the greater the differences, the greater the trade. If the home country and the rest of the world have only modest differences in factor endowments, the factor content of trade will indeed be small. But if they trade similar goods, i.e., goods whose relative factor intensities do not differ greatly, a large volume of commodity trade will be required to effect even a modest volume of factor-content trade. I recall John Chipman arguing years ago (at a conference I do not otherwise recall) that a large volume of trade in similar goods between similar countries was quite consistent with comparative advantage. At the time I berated him for saying what I thought was obvious. But he was right and I was wrong: Most of the profession did indeed have the quite different, erroneous, view that John was critical of.
So the "new" trade theory's emphasis on scale economies and imperfect competition was based on false pretenses. Like the US invasion of Iraq to deal with weapons of mass destruction.
But that does not imply that it was not constructive ("new trade theory," I mean, not the invasion). It stimulated much interesting work. Indeed, it was very helpful to me. I was at the time much interested in scale economies, and so the desire for a "new trade theory" helped give me an audience.
There was, at the time, a small but old literature on trade and increasing returns. The main concern of this literature was how increasing returns could alter established, comparativeadvantage, results. The concern of my research project was the idea that, in a globalized economy 
International Factor Markets
My interest in international factor transactions involved both factor trade in general and the mobility of particular factors. Regarding the latter, I have been concerned, to some degree, with both capital and labor. But not land. My interest in labor migration was sparked by the realization that very much of it was temporary, at least in original intent, as opposed to the "across the wide ocean" story of i Ownership (the investing firm has some attribute it can exploit abroad); ii Locational (it pays to exploit the attribute by producing abroad rather than by exporting); iii Internalization (there is a reason to have control over the foreign production rather than completely delegating it to another firm). There was a well-developed theoretical literature, with empirical support, based on i and ii.
Much less had been done regarding internalization aspects. This was my concern in "The
Multinational Firm," my basic contribution to the literature on direct investment, and another paper that I regard as among my best.
My basic approach was that contracts between firms are necessarily incomplete, in an uncertain world, and that internalization basically amounted to retaining ex post control. Thus internalization concerns should mandate direct investment, rather than arms-length contracts, where such control was likely to be important. In the industrial-organization literature, Grossman and Hart were at the same time grappling with similar concerns. But I was unaware of their efforts, and so did not profit from them. Too bad: Could have saved me some time.
A basic result was that ex post control was likely to be most important when source and host countries were similar. In that case unexpected shocks were most likely to dominate the division of activities between the two countries rendering ex post control crucial. If the countries are very different, the division of activities between them is much less likely to be subject to unexpected shocks. This offered an explanation of why direct investment is much greater between countries with similar factor endowments than between those with dissimilar endowments. 
Included Papers

Regional Integration
Beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the formation of regional trade agreements were simply concerned with the implications of the then emerging theories of intra-industry trade for regional integration. Our results included the proposition that a limited regional arrangement, under certain weak conditions, would be Pareto improving, and that a limited retreat from a regional arrangement, again under weak conditions, would also be Pareto improving. These are much relevant to the current international situation, but we did not realize that at the time (at least, I did not realize it: probably Henrik did).
My interest in the "new regionalism" came later, as I began to ponder the "extraordinary coincidence" referred to above. A key moment for me was when I attended a seminar on the topic by John Whalley. I recall neither the occasion nor the title of the paper. John's argument was that the new regionalism was a way in which developing countries were trying to obtain insurance against a possible collapse of multilateralism into nationalistic trade wars. I did not buy that argument. But John's way of posing his question, and his setting of it in the context of the developing multilateral order, was a huge stimulus to my different approach to these issues.
Thank you John.
My explanation of the new regionalism, and of the "extraordinary coincidence," came in the 
Administered Protection
During much of the late 1980s and 1990s I concentrated on issues involving administered protection. I now regard that as a fallow period. Or, more candidly, as time I wish I had spent otherwise -like sipping sake in Kyoto.
Still, there are some contributions I do not wish to repudiate. The early paper, "Dumping,"
combined the theoretical contractural literature of the time with a hard look at actual antidumping policy to give a theory of how I thought antidumping actually worked. I think it is still centrally relevant, though the increased reliance since then on antidumping has made other concerns more prominent than they had been. Still, this paper did not attempt to set antidumping into a more general context of the international commercial system.
I attempted the latter in the (less formal) paper, "The Economics and Political Economy of 
The Political Economy of Trade Policy
My main concern over the most recent decade or so has been the political economy of trade policy. Arye Hillman, my first grad student, who has himself made central contributions to the area, had long urged me to take it up. Eventually I did so.
The reason was that my work on regionalism, by its nature, had caused me to begin thinking about the overall functioning of the world commercial system. This was addressed in "Unilateralism in A Multilateral World," which concluded that a critical role could be played by policy administrators not concerned with maximizing national welfare, as discussed in the previous section. But this could not be a matter of policy delegation by trade-agreement negotiators, as they would never choose to so delegate. (This is another of the papers that I regard as among my best).
A second reason for my concern with the political economy of trade policy is that it seemed to me that the dominant academic literature had it all wrong (Hillman, etc. excepted) . This literature gives the central role to governmental concern about the terms of trade and about trade-tax revenue, a concern that I could not see was present at all in reality (as regards the industrial countries).
This found expression in "Political Externalities, Nondiscrimination, and A Multilateral
World." I regard this as another of my badly-written papers, though in this case I have been unable to think of anyone else I could possibly blame for that. (But I continue to work on it).
Another aspect of my concern with the dominant academic literature was its empirical component. I thought that this component was of great quality in itself, but that it related in a highly suspect way to both the theory and reality. This motivated the papers, "Selling 'Protection for Sale'" and "The Political-Support Approach to Protection." It also played a big role in the survey piece, "The Political Economy of Protection."
The theoretical literature on trade agreements emphasized the role of trigger strategies in sustaining repeated-game equilibria. This may or may not explain a desire by major countries to adhere to the international order in a general way. But it clearly had nothing to do with the WTO punishment mechanism in its dispute-settlement process. 
Some Topics in Trade Theory
This section includes some papers that I like but that do not fit naturally into the above categories.
i The theory of effective protection was a very active topic of inquiry in the 1970s, but it then quickly disappeared as a subject for theoretical research. I've been told that my paper, "The Theory of Effective Protection in General Equilibrium: Effective-Rate Analogues of Nominal
Rates," was part of the reason. I doubt that. But in any case that was not my intent.
In August 1973 the Journal of International Economics published a symposium on the theory of effective protection in general equilibrium. This included a paper by Jagdish Bhagwati and T.
N. Srinivasan which dealt with ideas I had been in contact with Bhagwati about. I felt that justice had not been done to these ideas, so I prepared the paper reprinted here and submitted it to the JIE. The editor, none other than Bhagwati, said he would not accept it, but also said that he was sure that Harry Johnson would want it for the Journal of Political Economy.
Young and naive, I followed Bhagwati's advice, and Johnson promptly rejected the paper. [In fairness to Johnson I point out that he had previously accepted for the JPE another paper of mine -now completely forgotten -on the same topic of effective protection].
I then submitted the paper to the Canadian Journal of Economics, which accepted it and published it. By then, Harry Johnson had died, at an unfairly young age. A Harry Johnson Prize was established to honor the best paper published in the CJE each year. My paper, which Harry himself had rejected, shared the prize in its first year. Sometimes things just turn out that way.
ii The formal academic discussion of globalization was largely concerned with explaining its apparent positive effect on the skilled-wage premium. The basic empirical conclusion was that trade liberalization (or globalization) was much less important an explanatory variable than the emergence of skill-biased technical change. This was reinforced by the fact that a StolperSamuelson explanation seemed confounded by the fact that the skill premium rose in both sides of the international market.
The paper, "Globalization, Globalisation: Trade, Technology and Wages," was motivated by the suspicion that changes in intra-sectoral substitution due to globalization were much more important than the traditional trade-theory, inter-sectoral substitutions. This led to my central argument that the skill-biased technical change did not come from god but was itself at least partly an endogenous effect of globalization.
iii As mentioned in the earlier section on Economies of Scale, there was in the 1980s a dominant erroneous view that comparative-advantage could not explain the large volume of trade in similar goods between similar countries. The logical error was just that the statement, "trade is due to differences between countries," does not imply that "the greater the differences, the greater the trade." But the theory of comparative advantage did seem to suggest that more differences meant more gains.
So I was motivated to address this in the paper, "The Greater the Differences, the Greater the Gains?" It's not for me to judge how successful I may have been, but this does seem to me one of the very fundamental issues in the theory of international trade that should have been addressed long ago.
I suspect that one of the reasons that I have a fondness for these three papers is that none was judged worthy of publication in a major journal. But if I had included all the papers that satisfied that criterion the present publication would look more like a library than a volume.
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